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MAXIMUM CONTAMINANT LEVELS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INJURIES
James R. Wedeking

I.

INTRODUCTION

Identifying injuries in a tort action is usually straightforward: a wrecked
automobile; a broken leg; the loss of an investment. In toxic tort cases,
injuries can be less obvious, and establishing their existence often requires
expert testimony. These injuries may involve devalued real estate or serious
illnesses with multiple potential causes. The associated questions of proof
can be complex,' but at least the concept of injury in these cases is simple:
the plaintiffs property is worthless (or worth less) or the plaintiff is sick.
Even the hybrid tort/remedy of medical monitoring involves an injury that
is, theoretically, easy to define: an exposure to harmful compounds so
significant as to warrant medical evaluations to detect any future illnesses
caused by exposure to contaminants. 2
However, there is a difference in some situations involving potentially
contaminated drinking water. In these cases, all of the parties can agree on
the same key facts-what contaminants are in the water and at what
concentrations-but still dispute whether the plaintiff is, or ever could be,
injured. This dilemma turns on what level of contamination constitutes
proof of an injury. The question leads easily to a potential extreme: the
proposition that a single molecule of contamination floating through an

Sidley Austin, LLP; J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author represented one of the many defendants in the In re MTBE Products
Liability Litigation multi-district litigation, but that client settled before trial.
Subsequently, a jury reached a verdict in favor of the City of New York and against the
only remaining defendant, ExxonMobil Corporation. City of New York v. ExxonMobil
Corp., 04-cv-3417 (S.D.N.Y.). This case is currently on appeal before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, 10-4329-cv, where the author represented two trade
associations as amici curiae in support of ExxonMobil Corporation, although not
regarding issues discussed in this article. The author would like to thank David T.
Buente, Jr. and Karen K. Mongoven of Sidley Austin, LLP for their thoughts and
contributions to this article.
1. Albert Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury,
78 S. CAL. L. REv. 1439 (2004) (discussing difficulties in proof of causation due to
latency).
2.

See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990).
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aquifer constitutes an injury to the plaintiff. This "single molecule" theory
would be a simple, bright-line rule, but it collapses in the real world where
no such thing as "pristine" water exists. Relatively recent laboratory
advances reveal that public drinking water typically contains large numbers
of contaminants in trace amounts. 3 All drinking water, from city tap water
to San Pellegrino, is "contaminated" to some degree. 4 However, the mere
existence of contaminants does not mean that potential plaintiffs, such as
those who own the contaminated water source or those drinking the water,
have been in ured. The age-old tenet of toxicology is that "the dose makes
the poison. This means that all substances are toxic when the dose is high
enough.6 Conversely, one can ingest a supposedly "toxic" substance at
levels below which it will cause either acute or long-term effects-rebuking
a "single molecule" approach to injury.
Determining the threshold level at which a substance must be present in
drinking water before someone could suffer from either acute or long-term
adverse effects is the purpose of a maximum contaminant level ("MCL").
MCLs are enforceable regulations establishing "the maximum permissible
level of a contaminant in water which is delivered to any user of a public
water system."7 State agencies and the Environmental Protection Agency

3. Pharmaceuticalsin the Nation's Water: Assessing PotentialRisks and Actions to
Address the Issue: HearingBefore the Senate Subcomm. on Transp. Safety, Infrastructure
Sec., and Water Quality, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Dr. Shane Snyder),
http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStoreid=f6376de2
-be60-4bcf-89b3-80a51ael750e ("The fact that more pharmaceuticals are detected today
is not due to greater contamination of our nation's water, but a reflection of the
increasingly sensitive analytical technology that allows us to identify and quantify
diminishingly minute concentrations of these chemicals in water.") [hereinafter
Pharmaceuticalsin the Nation's Water].
4. See, e.g., William Shotyk & Michael Krachler, Lead in Bottled Waters:
Contaminationfrom Glass and Comparison with Pristine Groundwater, 41 ENV'T SCI.
TECH. 103508-13 (2007) (finding that lead levels in glass-bottled water was higher than
lead levels in "pristine groundwater"

but all

detections were below maximum

contaminant levels).

5. MELVIN D. JOESTEN ET AL., THE WORLD OF CHEMISTRY: ESSENTIALS 438
(Brooks/Cole eds., 4th ed. 2007).
6. MICHAEL A. KAMRIN, TOXICOLOGY: A PRIMER ON TOXICOLOGY PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS 4 (Informa Healthcare 1988).

7. 40 C.F.R. § 141.2 (2011).
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("EPA" or "Agency") have established MCLs for a slew of different
contaminants, from microorganisms to radionuclides, that are often found in
drinking water. EPA sets an MCL under the Safe Water Drinking Act8 by
considering the highest level at which a contaminant shows no adverse effect
in people and then considers modifying that level upward based on
considerations such as the inability to detect the contaminant at very low
concentrations, the availability of treatment technologies, or the potential for
expensive treatment costs to outweigh marginal health benefits.9
Although MCLs are not perfect "no harm" indicators, using an MCL is
the most practical method available to determine whether drinking water is
contaminated to the point of establishing an injury. To paraphrase Winston
Churchill, using MCLs to establish the presence or absence of an injury is
the worst form of analysis except all the others that have been tried.10
Settling the question of how much contamination is required to constitute an
injury with clear and easily applicable proof will become increasingly
important as detection technology continues to improve and concern grows
regarding minute amounts of pharmaceuticals and personal care products in
drinking water.II
While the hypothetical "single molecule" approach discussed above has
not yet been pursued seriously, a high-profile and potentially influential
court opinion has come very close. In consolidated multi-district litigation
actions, water districts from around the nation sued dozens of petroleum
companies alleging that methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE")
contamination, often at barely detectable levels, required extensive (and
expensive) investigation and remediation.12 The Defendants moved for
summary judgment on all claims by three New York State water providers
relating to contamination below the established MCLs for MTBE as failing

8. Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (2006).
9.

See infra Part II.

10. 444 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1947) 207 (U.K.), available at
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/nov/ 1/parliament-bill.
11.

See generally Pharmaceuticalsin the Nation's Water, supra note 3; see also

EPA, PHARMACEUTICALS AND PERSONAL CARE PRODUCTS, http://www.epa.gov/ppcp/

faq.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2011).
12.
2001).

See generally In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y.
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to establish standing due to lack of a cognizable injury.13 The court denied
the motion, holding that "[w]hile it may eventually be determined that some
levels of contamination below the applicable MCLs do not in ure plaintiffs'
protected interests," the matter should be resolved by a jury. This holding
eschewed the MCLs as a clear and sensible threshold for potential injury and
effectively discarded scientifically derived standards in favor of a case-bycase, expert witness-driven process that places a jury in the role of
toxicologist.
This article endorses the use of MCLs as a bright-line rule to establish the
existence or absence of an injury. Part II describes the process through
which EPA and state agencies establish MCLs for drinking water
contaminants. Part III describes the arguments presented to the MTBE court
and the court's troubling holding on the injury prong of standing. Finally,
Part IV discusses the implications of the MA4TBE opinion, such as providing
potential plaintiffs with the ability to establish standing based on their own
subjective beliefs and the mistaken view that MCLs govern standards of
conduct instead of injury. Part IV also explains why the use of MCLs as a
bright-line rule for determining potential injury is preferable to the MTBE
court's holding that only a jury can determine whether low levels of a
contaminant will harm a plaintiff.
II.

MAXIMUM CONTAMINANT LEVELS

The Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") requires the EPA Administrator
to promulgate national primary drinking water regulations for public water
systems.15 EPA issues these regulations, known as maximum contaminant
levels, or MCLs,16 for contaminants that are known to be present in drinking
water, believed to have an adverse effect on human health, and for which
there is a "meaningful opportunity for health risk reduction."7 States may
also set their own MCLs so long as they are at least as stringent as any
existing federal MCLs.' 8 An MCL establishes the "maximum permissible
13. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 458 F. Supp. 2d 149, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(appeal pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
14.

Id. at 158.

15.

42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(1)(A) (2006).

16.

40 C.F.R. § 141.2 (2012).

17.

42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(1)(A).

18.

Id. § 300g-2(a)(1).
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level of a contaminant in water which is delivered to any user of a public
water system."l9 In other words, MCLs are "safe levels that are protective
of public health."20
MCLs, whether they are established by EPA or a state agency, must be
based on "the best available, peer-reviewed science and supporting studies
conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific practices"
derived from "data collected by accepted methods or best available
methods." 21 In setting an MCL, EPA begins with a maximum level
contaminant goal ("MCLG").2 2 This is the "maximum level of a
contaminant in drinking water at which no known or anticipated adverse
effect on the health of persons would occur, and which allows an adequate
margin of safety." 23 In setting MCLGs, EPA relies on reference doses and
cancer classifications for each contaminant under review, including
consideration of sensitive groups, such as children. 24 EPA derives a
reference dose from the no-observed-adverse-effect level ("NOAEL") or
lowest-observed-adverse-effect level ("LOAEL") established by animal and
human studies. 25 The reference dose includes an uncertainty factor of 10,
100, or 1,000 depending on the amount of data available from human and
animal studies.26 Where EPA has to use a LOAEL (instead of a NOAELmeaning the complete absence of observable health effects), the Agency

19.

40 C.F.R. § 141.2.

20. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations-Synthetic Organic Chemicals;
Monitoring for Unregulated Contaminants; Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,690, 25,694 (July
8, 1987); see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan;
Final Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8750 (Mar. 8, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300)
("MCLs represent the level of water quality that EPA believes is acceptable for over 200
million Americans to consume every day from public drinking water supplies.").
21.

42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A).

22.

42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(l)(A).

23. 40 C.F.R. § 141.2. MCLGs are a starting point in the MCL process; they are not
enforceable standards on their own. Id.
24. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 3526, 3531-32 (Jan.
30, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141-43).
25.

Id. at 3,532.

26.

Id.
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incorporates an additional safety factor ranging from I to 10.27 A drinking
water equivalent level results from a calculation considering uncertainty
factors, including an assumed adult's body weight and daily water
consumption.28
Carcinogenicity is assessed on a separate track, by evaluating the weight
of evidence that a particular contaminant causes cancer in humans based on
epidemiological and animal studies.29 EPA draws on pre-existing research
from a variety of entities both within and outside of the Agency, such as the
National Toxicology Program, the EPA Science Advisory Board, the
National Research Council, the World Health Organization, and the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. 30 Based on these studies,
individual contaminants are segregated into one of six groups, such as
"[p]robable human carcinogen" or "[p]ossible human carcinogen." 3 1 After
considering any other information on carcinogenicity, EPA then classifies
the contaminant as a Category I cancer risk (strong evidence of
carcinogenicity), Category II (limited evidence of carcinogenicity), or
Category Ill (inadequate or no animal evidence of carcinogenicity). 32
Category I carcinogens are automatically assigned an MCLG of zero.33 EPA
defended this policy by citing legislative history providing the EPA
Administrator with the discretion to impose a zero MCL "if any adverse
health effects can reasonably be anticipated, even though not proved to
exist." 34 Category II carcinogen MCLGs are calculated through the
reference dose process with yet another safety margin of up to 10 or a cancer

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 3526, 3536 (Jan. 30,
1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141-43).
31.

Id. at 3532.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34. Id. at 3533 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1185); see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding EPA's zero MCLG policy for
carcinogens in drinking water).
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risk range of 10-5 to 10-6 (a 1 in 100,000 to I in one million cancer risk). 35
Category III carcinogens go through the reference dose process without an
added margin of safety. 36
Of course, MCLGs are "aspirational, health-based goal[s]" 37 and, standing
alone, their enforcement is impractical because an MCLG of zero is
"undetectable and unachievable." The enforceable standards-MCLs-are
set "as close to the MCLG as is feasible." 39 The term "feasible" is key to the
MCL. The SDWA defines this as considering "the use of the best
technology, treatment techniques and other means which the Administrator
finds, after examination for efficacy under field conditions and not solel
under laboratory conditions, are available (taking cost into consideration).' Y
EPA interpreted this requirement as allowing it to "project operating
conditions for a specific contaminant using a field tested technology from
laboratory or pilot systems data,"41 potentially expanding the universe of
treatment technologies to include those that have never actually been used in
practice. Under the SDWA's definition of feasibility, with EPA's liberal
interpretation, the MCL may be higher than its corresponding MCLG only
when no treatment technology exists to reduce a contaminant down to the
MCLG, existing treatment techniques are exorbitantly expensive, or if field
monitoring and analysis methods cannot detect contaminants at levels as low
as the MCLG.
In evaluating treatment technologies, EPA performs an engineering
assessment to find the control technologies with the highest removal rates
that are compatible with other water treatment processes.42 Based on the
35. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 3532-33.
36. Id. at 3532.
37.

DANIEL STIENWAY ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 477 (21st ed.

2011).
38. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 3534. Note also
that MCLGs are not to be used as remedial cleanup goals under CERCLA due to the
impracticality of attaining these levels. Id. See also National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8750 (Mar. 8, 1990).
39.

42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4)(B) (2006).

40.

42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4)(D).

41.

National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 3547.

42.

Id.
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selected technologies' removal rates, "EPA calculates the level of each
contaminant that is achievable by their application to large systems with
relatively clean raw water sources.A 3 With the technology and the removal
rate in hand, EPA evaluates the "total national compliance costs for each
contaminant considering the number of systems that will have to install
treatment in order to comply with the MCL."44 Of course, if the MCL is
very low, the number of water providers that will have to install treatment
technology will increase, driving the costs higher and potentially requiring
EPA to resort to a higher MCL in the name of feasibility. 45 To date, EPA
has only increased the MCL due to prohibitive costs for three
contaminants.46
EPA's feasibility analysis also considers practical
quantitation levels, which determine whether laboratories can detect the
contaminants at the MCL. 4 7 If EPA sets an MCL below non-detectable
levels, there is no way to enforce compliance. This is why EPA cannot
practically make any MCL equivalent to zero-"a number which by
definition can be neither measured nor attained."48 Lastly, EPA re-evaluates
the MCL to ensure that it adequately protects public health, especially with
respect to carcinogens.49 MCLs may not present more than a 10-4 to 10-6
excess individual cancer risk during a lifetime exposure to the
contaminant.50

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Stage 2 Disinfectants and
Disinfection Byproducts Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 388, 445 (Jan. 4, 2006) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142) (rejecting lower MCLs for total trihalomethanes and
haloacetic acid due to cost); National Primary Drinking Water Regulations;
Radionuclides; Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,708, 76,714 (Dec. 7, 2000) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142) (raising MCL for radionuclides from the proposed 20 Pg/L to
30 gg/L after a costs-benefit analysis).
47.

National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 3547.

48.

Id

49. Id
50.

Id.
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MCLs are legally enforceable standards and whenever a water provider
fails to comply with them, either the state agency or EPA may file an
enforcement action. 1 Violations can result in civil penalties of up to
$37,500 per day and a court mar issue whatever injunctive relief is
Public water providers must also
necessary to protect public health.
inform their customers whenever they fail to meet an MCL.53 Where MCL
violations raise the "potential to have [a] serious adverse effect[ ] on human
health," these notices must be distributed to the public no more than 24
hours after the violation, providing a clear explanation of the potential health
effects, how the water system will correct the problem, and a direction to
find alternative water supplies.54
Although EPA established MCLs for 81 drinking water contaminants,55
MTBE is not among them. Several states, including New York, filled this
void by establishing their own MTBE MCLs. New York's MTBE MCL of
10 parts per billion ("ppb"),56 the subject of the MTBE opinion, is the lowest
New York law does not specify standards for how its
in the country.
of
Health
("NYDOH") establishes MCLs. However, the 2003
Department
NYDOH proposed rulemaking to reduce the MTBE MCL from 50 ppb to 10
ppb showed that the State considered many of the same health factors as
EPA does in its own MCL process.58 In the proposed rulemaking's
51.

42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(l)(B) (2006).

52. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(b); see also 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (Table 1) (adjusting daily
maximum civil penalties for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(b) from $25,000 per day to
$37,500 per day).
53.

42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006).

54.

42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(2)(C) (2006).

55. See 40 C.F.R. § 141.61 (MCLs for organic contaminants); § 141.62 (MCLs for
inorganic contaminants); § 141.63 (MCLs for microbiological contaminants); §141.64
(MCLs for disinfection byproducts); §141.65 (MCLs for radionuclides).
56.

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 5-1.52, Table 3 (2012).

57. See EPA OFFICE OF GROUNDWATER AND DRINKING WATER, REGULATORY
DETERMINATIONS
SUPPORT
DOCUMENT
FOR
CCL2
13-60
(2008),
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/ccl/pdfs/regdetermine2/report-ccl2reg2_supportdocument chl4_mtbe.pdf (note that table includes older New York MCL of
50 ppb, which was reduced to 10 ppb on December 24, 2003).
58.

36 N.Y. REG., Rule Making Activities 12 (Sept. 10, 2003).
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explanation of "Needs and Benefits," NYDOH stated that there was
"sufficient toxicological data to raise concern over the potential human
health risks of MTBE in drinking water," citing studies on both human and
animal subjects. 59 NYDOH reviewed the new standard's cost and concluded
that lowering the MTBE MCL to 10 ppb would not have "cost impacts on
any regulated parties." 60
Determining any level of chemical exposure deemed to be generally
"safe" involves several unknowns, and there is always room for
disagreement. 6 1 However, the approach taken by state and federal regulators
in establishing MCLs is generally cautious and conservative. Although there
is always the chance that scientists may learn that a chemical is more
harmful than previously believed, safety factors are employed at multiple
stages to compensate for this possibility. Through these safety factors,
MCLs can be set to as much as 10,000 times below the lowest observed
adverse effect level.62 On the other side of the e uation, off-setting these
safety factors due to economic concerns is a rarity. In general, MCLs are
credible, scientifically-based determinations of how much a person can be
exposed to a chemical in drinking water without suffering harm.
III.

THE MTBE OPINION

Beginning in the early 2000s, a group of plaintiffs' law firms organized
over one hundred public water districts, private water providers, and
municipalities around the nation to file suits against dozens of oil
64
companies.
The chief allegation was that the oil companies introduced

59.

Id. at 13.

60.

Id.

61. For example, there are often questions of how well animal studies can be
extrapolated to predict a chemical's impact on humans. See, e.g., Niall Shanks et al., Are
Animal Models Predictivefor Humans?, 4 PHIL. ETHICS & HUMAN. MED. 1747 (2009);
see generally Lawrence H. Lash et al., Metabolism of Trichloroethylene, 108 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. supp. 2, 177 (2000).
62. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 3526, 3531-32
(Jan. 30, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141-43).
63. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Radionuclides; Final Rule, 65
Fed. Reg. 76,708, 76,714 (Dec. 7, 2000).
64. The term "oil companies" is loosely defined to include the traditional verticallyintegrated oil companies, such as ExxonMobil and Chevron, to small regional refiners
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MTBE into gasoline in the late 1970s to boost octane. The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 included the reformulated gasoline ("RFG") program,
requiring gasoline to contain at least 2% oxygen by weight in order to reduce
ground level ozone in heavily polluted areas.66 The RFG program also
required gasoline to contain at least 2.7% oxygenate during the winter for
areas with unacceptably high carbon monoxide pollution.67 Although
Congress did not specify which oxygenates must be used, MTBE became
the oxy enate of choice over the few potential alternatives, such as
ethanol. This led to a dramatic increase in the amount of MTBE blended
into gasoline, where each gallon could contain up to 15% MTBE.69
According to the Plaintiffs, however, the oil industry selected the wrong
oxygenate to comply with federal mandates. 7 0 The Plaintiffs alleged that
underground storage tanks at gas stations routinely leaked and released
MTBE gasoline into groundwater.71 They alleged that, once in the
environment, MTBE moves farther and faster through groundwater than
gasoline and resists degradation. 72 Once in the water supply, the Plaintiffs'
complaints alleged, MTBE causes cancer and imparts a foul taste and odor at

and some commodities traders. Generally, they were each alleged to play a role in the
design, manufacture and distribution of MTBE gasoline. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig.,
379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
65.

Id. at 365.

66. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (2006)).
67.

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(m)).

68.

Id.

See also EPA, OXYGENATE TYPE ANALYSIS

www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/fuels/mtbe/oxy-type.pdf
MTBE over ethanol, ETBE and TAME).
69.

1995 RFG SURVEY DATA,
(showing dominant usage of

175 F. Supp. 2d at 600.

70. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(discussing testimony of plaintiffs' expert that defendants' could have used ethanol
instead of MTBE).
71.

In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

72.

Id. at 364-365.

194

The Journalof Contemporary Health Law andPolicy

Vol. XXVIII:2

extremely low concentrations, 73 prompting claims of public nuisance, strict
liability for design defect and/or defective product, failure to warn,
negligence, private nuisance, trespass, and state statutory violations. 7 4
Consolidated into a multi-district litigation docket, the assigned judge
heard several arguments common to all of the cases and selected a handful
of "focus cases" to proceed through discovery towards trial. In three of the
focus cases, all involving New York water providers, the Defendants moved
for summary judgment where evidence showed that the MTBE
contamination alleged by the Plaintiffs was below the New York MCL. 7 6
They argued that because the Plaintiffs could still lawfully serve drinking
water with MTBE concentrations below the 10 ppb MCL, they had no
legally protected interest at stake and therefore lacked standing. 7 7 To aid in
this argument, the Defendants adduced evidence that Plaintiffs routinely
served water to their customers with a multitude of contaminants in trace
amounts.
Plaintiffs publicly admitted to their customers that no drinking
water, including bottled water, can be completely free of contaminants and
that compliance with MCLs assured that the water was safe to drink. 79 To
allow the Plaintiffs standing to recover for sub-MCL contamination, the
Defendants argued, would be to determine that there is a legally protected

73.

Id. at 365.

74.

Id. at 424.

75.

In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 510 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

76.

In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 458 F. Supp. 2d 149, 151-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

77. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment on All Claims for Lack of Justiciability at 4-6, In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig.,
379 F. Supp. 2d 348 (2006) (No. 00-cv-1898) [hereinafter Defs' MSJ] (on file with
author).
78.
2010

Id. at 5-6; see also NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF ENvTL. PROT., NEW YORK CITY
10
(2010),
REPORT
AND
QUALITY
WATER
SUPPLY
DRINKING

www.nyc.gov/html/dep/pdf/wsstatel0.pdf.
79. Defs' MSJ, supra note 77, at 2-4; see also NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF ENVTL.
PROT., supra note 78, at 10-11; Basic Information about Regulated Drinking Water
http://water.epa.gov/drink/contaminants/
Contaminants and Indicators, EPA,
basicinformation (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (stating that "[dirinking water, including
bottled water, may reasonably be expected to contain at least small amounts of some
contaminants").
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interest "in drinking water containing zero MTBE," the exact standard that
Plaintiffs publicly declared to their customers could not be met.80 As for
Plaintiffs' claim that customers could taste or smell MTBE in drinking water
even when concentrations were below the MCL, Defendants argued that
Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence that they had ever received such a
complaint.81
In response, the Plaintiffs denied that MCLs should play a role in the case,
objecting that the court should not "replace traditional notions of standing
and injury in tort cases with a state regulatory standard."82 They made an
attack on MCLs a centerpiece in the defense of their claims, arguing that
they were neither designed for, nor capable of, protecting public health.
Deference to the MCL, they argued, would undermine the role of the
judiciary84 and eliminate their right to "water that is free from environmental
contamination."85 Additionally, the Plaintiffs argued that the MTBE MCL
failed to consider aesthetic qualities, such as taste and odor.86 Instead of
using the MCLs to determine the presence or absence of injury, the Plaintiffs
contended that it was reasonable for them to make their own determination
of injury based on general statutory requirements to investigate "deleterious
changes in raw water quali " and to "exercise due care and diligence" in
preventing water pollution.
Plaintiffs argued that their standing should

80.

Defs' MSJ, supra note 77, at 2.

81.

Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for

Summary Judgment on All Claims for Lack of Justiciability at 2-3, In re MTBE Prods.
Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348 (2006) (No. 00-cv-1898) [hereinafter Defs' Reply] (on
file with author).
82. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on All
Claims for Lack of Justiciability at 1, In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d
348 (2006) (No. 00-cv-1898) [hereinafter Pls' Resp.] (on file with author).
83.

Id. at 8-12.

84.

Id. at 11.

85. Id. at 2-3 (quotation omitted) (citing State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459
N.Y.S.2d 971, 978 (1983)).
86.

Id. at 12.

87.

Id at 17-18 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. §§ 5-1.12, 71 (2012)).
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turn exclusively on whether they decide to take some type of action in
response to contamination, regardless of the MCL.88
The court sided with the Plaintiffs and denied the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment.
Despite several other cases finding no injury for
contamination below the MCL, the court relied on Plaintiffs' purported duty
to "take action-be it testing, monitoring, or treating contaminated wellsbefore that contamination reaches the applicable MCL."90 The court further
found that MCLs govern the Plaintiffs' duties in supplying public water, not
the Defendants' conduct in manufacturing or selling defective products, and
characterized the Defendants' position as one of regulator preemption of
common law claims before rejecting that characterization.9 In conclusion,
the MVTBE court found the MCL to be "a convenient guidepost in
determining that a particular level of contamination has likely caused an
injury" but that the question of injury, and thus standing, should be reserved
for a jury. 9 2 The case did, in fact, proceed to trial. The jury determined that
MTBE would, based on the Plaintiffs' groundwater modeling, reach New
York City drinking water wells and that it should be remediated. It awarded
approximately $104 million in damages to the City.9 3
IV.

PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE MTBE OPINION'S REJECTION OF MCLs
AS A DETERMINANT OF INJURY

The MTBE court's consideration of whether and how MCLs are used to
determine the existence of an injury is certainly the most in-depth of any
opinion on the issue. Despite the court's extensive treatment of the subject,
its decision to use MCLs as "convenient guidepost[s]," instead of defining
an injury, contradicts principles of standing and fails to show an
understanding of what MCLs actually are. In the process, the MTBE opinion
not only deprives parties of a bright-line rule, but it also creates a standard
that allows plaintiffs to define unilaterally their own injuries, despite

88.

Pls' Resp., supra note 82, at 17-19.

89.

In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 458 F. Supp. 2d 149, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

90.

Id. at 155.

91.

Id.

92.

Id. at 158.

93.

In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 739 F. Supp. 2d 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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objective evidence that they have not suffered any harm. The sections below
review some of these problems.
A.

Subjective Definition of Injury

Article III of the U.S. Constitution allows courts to hear only "cases and
controversies." 94 Although these are broad and ambiguous terms, the U.S.
Supreme Court distilled these terms to require plaintiffs to prove "the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing." 95 This is a three part test:
(1) "the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a
legally protected interest," (2) a "causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of," and (3) proof that it is "likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision."96 A plaintiffs injury must be "concrete and particularized" and
"actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."97 Establishing
standing is no _erfunctory matter; it is "an indispensable part of the
plaintiff s case." At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff must provide
actual evidence of injury, and at the trial stage, the injury must be proved,
i.e., supported by the evidence in accordance with the applicable standard of
proof.
The MTBE opinion clashes with one of the most basic notions of standing:
by the time a case reaches the summary judgment stage of litigation, the
plaintiff must be able to proffer evidence that it suffered an actual injury that
is not conjectural or hypothetical. 0 0 Instead, the MTBE decision allowed the
Plaintiffs' claims to continue based on their subjective beliefs that they were
injured. The court's decision centered on two New York regulations. The
first regulation defines the MTBE Plaintiffs' duty, as a matter of New York

94.

U.S. CoNsT., Art. III, § 2.

95.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

96.

Id. at 560-61 (internal quotations omitted).

97.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

98.

Id. at 561.

99.

Id.

100. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (requiring "specific facts" establishing an
injury).
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law, to serve "a safe, adequate and aesthetically pleasing supply of water." 01
Potable water is defined by state law as water that is "suitable for drinking,
culinary or food processing purposes." 02 The second regulation requires
water providers to monitor and treat contamination "where there is 'any
deleterious change in raw water quality."" 03 These regulations served as the
basis for the MTBE Plaintiffs' legally protected interests for standing
purposes. 104
According to the MTBE Plaintiffs, their legally protected interests in
serving potable water are "not limited by the MCL."1 In fact, the MTBE
Plaintiffs declared that "[t]he quality of water to which Plaintiffs are entitled
is not just 'water contaminated below maximum concentration levels' (as
Defendants suggest) but rather a 'water that is free from environmental
contamination."106 Once the MTBE Plaintiffs were allowed to claim that

potable water is equivalent to "water free from environmental
contamination,"' 0 7 the second regulation, establishing a general duty to
monitor and treat "any deleterious change in raw water quality,"' 08 made the
AITBE Plaintiffs the sole arbiter of their own standing. They argued, and the
MTBE court apparently agreed, that as water providers, they could claim any
level of a contaminant to be "deleterious" and subsequently recover the costs
of any monitoring or remediation activities they chose to undertake.' 09 In
this case, the MTBE Plaintiffs adopted an internal policy to remediate MTBE
101.

In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 458 F. Supp. 2d 149, 154 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

102.

N.Y. COMP. CODEsR. &REGS. tit. 10, § 170.3 (2012).

103. 458 F. Supp. 2d at 155 n.35 (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGs. tit. 10, § 51.12). California plaintiffs relied on a similar statute. Id. (citing CAL. WATER CODE, app.
§ 40-8(b)).
104.

Id. at 158.

105.

Id. at 154.

106. PIs' Resp., supra note 82, at 2-3 (quoting In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F.
Supp. 2d 593, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) and State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d
971, 978 (1983) (emphasis added)).
107.

Id. at 17.

108.

Id. at 18 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS tit. 10, § 5-1.12, 71 (2012)).

109. Id. at 19-20.
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contamination down to non-detect levels whenever it reached 1 ppb and
averred that whenever they act on this internal policy, they become
injured.o10 This reasoning allows plaintiffs to define subjectively their own
injury by substituting their own internal policies or personal preferences
regarding de minimis contamination for a scientifically derived regulatory
definition of when someone is exposed to harm. Indeed, the MTBE
Plaintiffs even cited a study showing that water consumers subjectively (and
incorrectly) believe that exposure to even trace amounts of chemicals will
harm them as a rationale for pursuing their purported sub-MCL injuries.'"
In practice, allowing a water supplier to establish an injury through its own
decision to institute monitoring or remediation creates an injury that is
completely out of the defendant's control. If a water supplier believes that
trace amounts of contaminants in a water supply are not worrisome and
decides not to continue testing or pursue remediation, then no injury occurs.
However, if it makes the opposite decision and chooses to remediate the
contaminant to levels even further below the MCL, then the water supplier,
not the defendant, creates the injury.
Despite the MTBE decision's analysis of New York regulations on water
quality, there is no reason to believe that the court's reasoning will be
limited to New York water suppliers, as its renunciation of MCLs was clear
and unequivocal.1 12 Thus, the MTBE Plaintiffs' theory of standing endorsed
in the MTBE opinion effectively makes everyone his or her own personal
regulator, where each of us determines what amount of contamination we
will tolerate in what we eat or drink (or serve to others to eat or drink). At
first blush, this does not sound so bad. There is much to be said for a person
deciding that he or she does not want even small concentrations of chemicals
in his or her water or food. Whether that person believes that future research
may show harm from contaminants at lower levels or distrusts the
110.

Defs' MSJ, supra note 77, at 17.

111. Pls' Resp., supra note 82, at 16 (citing N. Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology:
Expert andLay Judgments of Chemical Risks, 12 RISK ANALYSIs 228 (1992)).
112. Although the court appeared to nod, at first, towards New York regulations as
making the difference between the MTBE Plaintiffs and private parties, In re MTBE
Prods. Liab. Litig., 458 F. Supp. 2d 149, 155-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), it ultimately rejected
the use of MCLs in total. "More importantly, none of these decisions [cited by the
defendants] provide a persuasive reason why the MCL should establish the scope of the
protected interest or define, as a matter of law, what is and what is not an injury ...
Defendants do not argue-and this Court does not hold-that an MCL displaces common
law tort liability resulting from groundwater contamination." Id. at 156-57 (emphasis
added).
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competency or honesty of EPA (or the industry-reported data that EPA may
rely upon), this excess of caution is not beyond the bounds of reason. Some
companies market their products as exceeding some type of regulatory
standard or being free of legal but unpopular ingredients, understanding that
many people prefer such a cautious approach.
The problem comes when one files a tort suit alleging that the defendant
violated these policies or personal preferences. Any person or company that
manufactures, distributes, or uses a product containing the contaminant at
issue could be subject, not just to a multitude of varying personal standards,
but a "single molecule" standard of injury. Virtually all of these standards,
of course, would be undisclosed to the potential defendants before the suit.
Discarding MCLs in favor of a subjective policy or personal preference for
lower contaminant levels effectively gives plaintiffs sole authority in
defining their own injury up until trial, where a jury would have the final
word. No objective facts could alter this trajectory. The plaintiffs need only
state that they find contamination at levels below the MCL to be
unacceptable in order to prevent summary judgment against them, regardless
of the reasons for adopting that policy. Juries would then be asked to either
ratify or reject the plaintiffs personal policy. Over time, of course, the
emergence of differing jury verdicts results in an ad hoc set of incoherent
standards for the same contaminant in the same jurisdiction.
Some courts have rejected such a "personal regulator" a roach to
standing. For example, in Koronthaly v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of a class action
complaint alleging fraud, breach of implied warranty, strict liability, and
negligence related to the undisclosed lead content of the defendant's
lipstick.1 14 The class representative averred that she did not know the
lipstick contained lead when she purchased it and would never have bought
the lipstick had she known, because she believed that lead was unsafe.' 15
Although the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") did not regulate lead
in lipstick, the plaintiff alleged that L'Oreal's lipstick "contains lead in far
greater amounts than permitted in candy by the FDA."' The Third Circuit,
however, had no difficulty in affirming that the plaintiff failed to establish an

113.

Koronthaly v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., No. 08-4625, slip op. at 1 (3d Cir. March 26,

2010).
114.

Id.

115.

Id.

116.

Id.
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injury. First, the plaintiff s subjective belief that the lipstick was unsafe was
"belied by the FDA's report finding that the lead levels in the Defendant's
lipsticks were not dangerous and therefore did not require warnings."I17
Second, the plaintiff admitted to having suffered "no adverse health effects
from using the lipsticks.""8 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff lacked
standing because she could not press claims of injury based on what levels
of lead were subjectively unacceptable to her. Instead, the court deferred to
the FDA's findings on safety and affirmed the trial court's dismissal."19
Usually, even where courts recognize a cause of action for fear of future
harm, plaintiffs must provide some objectively verifiable evidence in order
to establish standing. For example, the California Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff could sustain a negligence action and recover damages for fear of
contracting cancer even when the plaintiff has no present physical injury or
illness.120 But that plaintiff must "prove . . . that the fear stems from a
knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical and scientific opinion, that it is
more likely than not that the feared cancer will develop in the future due to

117.

Id.

118.

Id.

119. Koronthaly, No. 08-4625, slip op. at 1. In a more general sense, courts have
rejected standing when plaintiffs subjectively believed there to be a risk of future hazard
presented by products. For example, in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FerrantiPackard Transformers, Inc., 201 A.D.2d 902, 903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), the court
dismissed plaintiffs' claim for the replacement of eleven transformers it purchased from
the defendant based on lack of standing. Although three of the fourteen transformers
plaintiffs purchased failed, resulting in fires, plaintiffs could not pursue damages for the
other eleven functioning transformers simply because they were afraid that they might
prove defective in the future. See also Beck Development Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 44
Cal. App. 4th 1160, 1213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("In order for a private party to enjoin an
alleged public nuisance on the ground of fear of future injury, it must, at a minimum,
establish facts to prove that the apprehension of injury is well founded . . . to establish a
nuisance the plaintiff must demonstrate an actual and unnecessary hazard.") (citation
omitted).
120. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965 (1993); see also Mauro v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 542 A.2d 16, 20-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)
(rejecting medical monitoring claim where risk of future injury could not be predicted
with a degree of medical certainty and quantified); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734
F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (D. Hawaii 1990) (even though plaintiffs can recover for mental
anguish without a physical injury, self-serving declarations about fear of contracting
cancer in the future are insufficient proof).
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the toxic exposure."l21 This general principle that plaintiffs must proffer
objective evidence of an injury is not special to the field of toxic torts. For
instance, in Poe v. Ullman, the U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
challenging Connecticut laws against the use of contraceptives lacked
standing because those laws were never enforced.12 2 The Court held that the
plaintiffs' standing must be "grounded in a realistic fear of prosecution,"
refusing to accept as an injury-in-fact the plaintiffs' "personal sensitiveness"
or a "chimerical . . . fear of enforcement" that could not be objectively

weighed.123
The MTBE Plaintiffs adopted a similar approach to the one that failed in
Koronthaly, arguing that they are "entitled" to "water that is free from
environmental contamination." 2 4 They buttressed their theory of standing
with testimony from New York environmental officials that water suppliers
should take action before contaminants reach the MCL.125 Each of the
Plaintiffs alleged injuries from acting on its own internal policy to remediate
MTBE contamination whenever it reached 1 ppb; specifically, monitoring
and testing costs, taking wells out of service, and having to replace
granulated activated carbon filters more frequently even though they were
installed to treat other pre-existing contaminants.1 This is no different than
Koronthaly's insufficient theory that trace amounts of lead in lipstick were
generally unsafe and created an injury.
Like the Koronthaly plaintiff, the MTBE Plaintiffs lacked the legally
protected interest required under Lujan.12 7 Instead, they tried to create one
through the adoption of their internal policy to remediate MTBE whenever
sampling showed concentrations in excess of 1 ppb.12 8 Of course, nothing
121.

Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 974.

122.

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961).

123.

Id. (emphasis added).

124.

Pls' Resp., supra note 82, at 2-3 (quotations omitted).

125.

Id. at 18-19.

126.

Id. at 20-25.

127. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (an injury-in-fact is a
"legally protected interest" that is both "concrete and particularized" and "actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.") (internal quotations omitted).
128.

Defs' MSJ, supra note 77, at 17.
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about their theory would prevent them from adopting a single molecule
standard of contamination, so long as that single molecule could be
detected.129 Legally protected interests that give rise to standing are
conferred by statute, contract, or the common law.1 30 Plaintiffs should be
required to show more than subjective beliefs of possible future harm, and a
plaintiff cannot imbue itself with a legally protected interest by simply
drafting an internal policy.131
Unfortunately, the MTBE decision never acknowledged the Plaintiffs' I
ppb MTBE policy and its integral role in their theory of standing. If the
MTBE decision is followed as a broad rule elsewhere, then a plaintiff need
only state a subjective desire that its drinking water (or foods or consumer
products or even the ambient air) has pollutant levels lower than regulatory
standards, and its alleged injury will be impossible to dispose of before the
case reaches trial.132 This use of subjective and personal assertions of injury
is incompatible with standing as it has been traditionally recognized by our
legal system.

129. See id. at 2 ("In effect, plaintiffs demand that this Court create a 'legally
protected interest' in drinking water that contains zero MTBE.").
130. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736 n.9 (1972) (discussing legally
protected interest in environmental resources as "an interest created by statutes.");
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983) (discussing legally
protected property interest conferred by a mortgage); Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d
535, 539 (Colo. 1977) ("The proper inquiry on standing is whether the plaintiff has
suffered an injury in fact to a legally protected interest as contemplated by statutory or
constitutional provisions.").
131. See Defs' MSJ, supra note 77, at 16 (plaintiffs are "free to adopt these standards
as internal business practices, but [they] cannot impose them on defendants by
demanding-under the guise of common law tort and statutory claims-that defendants
can be held liable for the costs [plaintiffs] incur[ ] to comply with such practices.").
132. The MTBE court's opinion was not a complete outlier in that there have been a
few other cases that have determined that any increases in pollutants constitute an injury,
regardless of whether the plaintiffs present any evidence that those increases were
harmful. In LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 269-70 (2d Cir. 2002), a plaintiff
opposing a proposed plant that would convert waste into ethanol claimed that increases in
sulfur dioxide emissions would injure her. Even though it was uncontested that the
increased emissions would still leave the ambient air well below national health standards
for sulfur dioxide, the court found that any "identifiable trifle" was enough to convey
standing. Id. at 270 (quoting Conservation Council of N.C. v. Costanzo, 505 F.2d 498,
501 (4th Cir. 1974)).
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If courts allowed standing pursuant to Plaintiffs' own subjective, internal,
and publicly undisclosed standards, then water suppliers could impose
liability on virtually any industrial defendant. This theory would also allow
consumer plaintiffs to manufacture their own standing against bottled water
companies and water providers (like the Plaintiffs in the MTBE cases) by
demanding preferences for zero-contaminant water.' 33 Although the
Defendants proffered facts that could allow a jury to doubt the sincerity of
the Plaintiffs' newly adopted MTBE policy,' an evaluation of whether a
plaintiff genuinely demands contaminant levels below an MCL cannot be
resolved through a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. The
biggest practical problem with the ATBE court's theory of standing is that
the issue must always go to a jury. That jury will almost certainly be
comprised of people who drink water with the same contaminants, making
them susceptible to scary-sounding, yet often baseless, assertions about
cancer and birth defects. This can put enormous pressure on defendants to
settle lawsuits that lack any objective showing of actual injury.
B.

The Conduct Fallacy

A critical aspect of the MTBE opinion was the court's inability to figure
out what it should do with MCLs. The court incorrectly interpreted MCLs
as a standard of conduct with which water providers must comply, similar to
the duty to avoid negligent or reckless conduct.'3 The court's failure to see
the MCLs as health-based standards determining whether water was safe or
unsafe to drink led to the errant conclusion that they are merely "convenient
guideposts" to determining injury.136 In other words, by misinterpreting the
133. In their motion, the defendants noted that the National Association of Water
Companies, a national trade association representing water providers, was lobbying
Congress to prohibit lawsuits based on sub-MCL contamination similar to the one
brought by the plaintiffs in this case. Defs' MSJ, supra note 77, at 2.
134. The defendants pointed out that the evidence showed that plaintiffs only adopted
the I ppb policy for MTBE. No other contaminant was supposed to be remediated before
it reached the MCL. Defs' MSJ, supra note 77, at 17. Furthermore, the MTBE plaintiffs
only adopted their 1 ppb policy for MTBE on the advice of their litigation counsel after
they filed suit against the defendants. Id. Prior to litigation, the plaintiffs served water
with trace amounts of MTBE and many other chemicals for years (and continued to do so
during the course of the litigation), always telling their customers that the water was safe
because it met the applicable MCLs. Id. at 4-5.
135.

In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 458 F. Supp. 2d 149, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

136.

Id. at 158.
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purpose of the MCLs, the court concluded that the MTBE Plaintiffs were
injured even though they were serving perfectly safe drinking water that
required no remediation.
This error originated from the MTBE Plaintiffs' briefing on the issue.
They argued against the use of the MTBE MCL as an objective
measurement of injury by characterizing it as merely a duty governing the
water providers' own conduct, not a regulatory determination related to
protecting public health. 137 Plaintiffs argued that "Defendants do not even
claim that they should not be liable because they themselves complied with a
regulatory standard; they ask, incredibly, that the Court find that they cannot
be liable based on Plaintiffs' compliance with a regulatory standard."" The
Plaintiffs' compliance with the law, they argued, "has no bearing on whether
Defendants were negligent in manufacturing and selling a defective product"
or "whether or not Defendants contaminated public water supplies."1 39 Of
course, whether Defendants were negligent or manufactured and sold a
defective product was not the issue at hand.
140
The Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs had sustained no injury.1
Despite clearly confusing these two very different legal concepts, the

137.

Pls' Resp., supra note 82, at 4-8.

138.

Id. at 6.

139.

Id.

140. The authorities relied upon by the MTBE plaintiffs are notable in that the only
contested question was whether the defendants' actions caused an injury, not the injury's
existence. Id. at 4. For example, the MTBE plaintiffs cited Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 935 F.
Supp. 1307, 1320-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), for the proposition that "a regulation is not
automatically adopted by New York courts as a standard of due care in negligence
litigation." Id. That statement is perfectly accurate yet irrelevant. In Hamilton, a suit
against handgun manufacturers, plaintiffs were "representatives of people who were shot
and killed by individuals who illegally obtained handguns." Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at
1313. The defendants in Hamilton did not argue that some government regulation called
into question the existence of the alleged injury (i.e., that dead people were actually
alive). Instead, they asserted that compliance with government regulations rendered them
not negligent as a matter of law. Id. at 1320. The court's refusal to accept this principle
on a motion for summary judgment is far less controversial than the MTBE plaintiffs'
claims about the existence of their purported injuries. Several of the MTBE plaintiffs'
other cases stand for the same or similar propositions and without any dispute about the
existence of an injury. See Pls' Resp., supra note 82, at 4-6 (citing Rudd v. Electrolux
Corp., 982 F. Supp. 355, 366 (M.D.N.C. 1997); Sch. Dist. of City of Independence v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 750 S.W.2d 442, 454-55 (Mo. App. 1988); Rucker v. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co., 77 Ill.2d 434, 440 (1979)). Other cases cited by the MTBE plaintiffs for
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Plaintiffs plowed ahead, arguing that the Defendants' negligence and
introduction of a defective product (MTBE) into the groundwater must have
injured the Plaintiffs, regardless of whether the Plaintiffs could meet their
regulatory obligations.14
Unfortunately, the MTBE court resolved that standards of care serve
double-duty in both defining conduct and defining the existence of an
injury.142 This is simply wrong; accusations that a defendant violated some
standard of care does not spawn an injury out of thin air. This confuses the
actions of one party with the injury of another. For example, a company can
negligently package food so that it spoils while on grocery store shelves. If
nobody buys or eats that food, however, then no consumer has an injury to
complain of even though the company most likely violated both regulatory
and common law standards of care. To put it even more simply, one may
stand in a shopping mall and flail away with a baseball bat, but despite this
reckless behavior, unless he hits someone or something, there is no injury.
The court's conflation of conduct with injury in the ATBE case allows a
plaintiff to satisfy injury requirements at the summary judgment stage by
simply reiterating its allegations that a defendant failed to meet standards of
conduct.
C.

MCLs as a Health ProtectionStandard

Use of the MCLs to define injury is both a credible and convenient brightline rule that would declare that, unless the plaintiff's drinking water source
contains a contaminant above the secondary MCL, no injury exists. This
rule would provide certainty to all parties while avoiding the cost of
litigating cases involving no palpable injuries (for example, if public water
suppliers were not required to treat their water to remove the contaminant
and nobody has actually gotten sick from drinking the water). Additionally,
it leaves the issues regarding the concentrations at which contaminants harm
people, the probability of that harm occurring, and the feasibility of treating
those contaminants with the EPA or a state environmental agency. The
alternative, as found in the MTBE case, would leave these questions to a jury
of laypeople that must suffer through days, or even weeks, of conflicting

support show that there was a question of fact as to whether contaminants were above a

regulatory threshold. See id. at 5 (citing German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 885
F. Supp. 537, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
141.

Pls' Resp., supra note 82, at 12-25.

142.

In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 458 F. Supp. 2d 149, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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expert witness testimony. Relying on MCLs prevents the definition of an
injury from varying from jury verdict to jury verdict.
While the benefits of using the MCL as the definition of injury are borne
out in more detail through a comparison with the alternative, discussed infra,
there are immediate concerns about such a standard that should be
addressed. First, one may object to the notion that there can ever be a "safe"
amount of contamination. Second, there may be concern with how accurate
MCLs are as a predictor of harm. MCLs, by definition, are compromised to
some degree by considerations of technical feasibility and cost.143 Even
further, some distrust EPA to establish accurate MCLs. in the face of political
pressure, industry influence, built-in regulatory biases, or simple error.
Lastly, there could be some concern that the use of a bright-line re ulatory
rule grants to defendants a "license to contaminate up to the MCL."
Each
of these potential objections is explored below.
1.

There is No "Safe" Concentrationof Chemicals

The notion that there are no "safe" concentrations of chemicals that can be
ingested by humans without ill effects has been proposed with varying
degrees of sophistication. At one end is the neo-luddite belief that virtually
all chemicals encountered in daily life are "toxic" in that they cause
unspecified adverse health effects at any non-zero concentration.14 At the
opposite end is the very real fact that human variability makes judgments of
what is "safe" difficult to make with absolute accuracy. As one toxicologist
phrased this concern: determining "the exact level at which a chemical
changes from a nontoxic to a toxic chemical . . . is not a scientifically
realistic goal." 46 Due to human variability, "what is 'safe' for one person
may not be 'safe' for another."l 47 Where the former view adopts a stance
that nobody is safe from chemical exposure at any level, the latter adopts a
view that, at some point large majorities of people can be safe but that

143. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4)(D) (2006).
144.

See Pls' Resp., supranote 82, at 6.

145.

See, e.g., RICK SMITH & BRUCE LOURIE, SLow DEATH BY RUBBER DUCK: How

THE Toxic CHEMISTRY OF EVERYDAY LIFE AFFECTS OUR HEALTH (Counterpoint 2009).

146.

KAMRIN, supra note 6 at 4.

147.

Id.
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outliers of human physiology leave the "single molecule" maxim alive, at
least in theory. 148
One other clear difference between the two approaches to the absence of
"safe" concentrations is the practicality of regulating chemicals. Adherents
of the first approach favor banning (at least) synthetic chemicals. 14 9 The
second approach realizes our waters are already saturated with chemicals,
and because of the "difficulty in detoxifying them" they cannot be
realistically eliminated. Thus, we must accept some level of these
substances in our environment and, if we want to have an enforceable
regulation, this level must be a definite non-zero number.150 Living in a
world with only "safe" concentrations of contaminants in drinking water is
simply not possible.15 1 Very few would be willing to forego all of the
beneficial uses of chemicals, from pharmaceuticals to plastics, in order to
eliminate trace amounts of chemicals from our drinking water supplies.
Even if society chose to do so today, existing contamination is ubiquitous
and will exist at levels below our ability to remove it for decades or more.152

148. MCLs can be used as a bright-line determination of what level of contaminants
are realistically "safe" for the population in general and whether contamination
necessitates treatment of drinking water sources by drinking water providers. Of course,
where there is medical evidence that an individual plaintiff suffered an illness caused by
ingestion of drinking water containing contaminants below the MCL, then the MCL
should not pose a bar to recovery. This is consistent with the long-standing "eggshell
skull" rule in tort law. See, e.g., Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir.
1983).
149. See, e.g., Petition for a Ban on Triclosan; Notice of Availability, 75 Fed. Reg.
76,461, 76,461 (Dec. 8, 2010) (a notice of petition to ban the anti-microbial triclosan);
Lead in Ammunition and Fishing Sinkers; Disposition of TSCA, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,377,
58,377 (Sept. 24, 2010) (a notice of petition to ban the use of lead in fishing sinkers and
firearms ammunition).
150.

KAMRIN, supra note 6, at 4-5.

15 1. Id. at 19 (noting that genetic variability causes some humans to be more sensitive
to chemical exposure at the same dosage than others).
152.

See, e.g. Christian G. Daughton, Non-regulated water contaminants: emerging

research, 24 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REv. 711, 713 (2004) ("Countless galaxies of

chemical classes have continual presence in waters-regardless of the water's purity.");
Id. at 724 ("Conventional municipal sewage treatment facilities were never designed to
remove exotic anthropogenic chemicals . . . ."); EPA OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, PUMP-AND-TREAT GROUND-WATER REMEDIATION: A GUIDE FOR DECISION

MAKERS AND

PRACTITIONERS

10-12

(1996)

(discussing

"realistic"

groundwater
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The only alternative is to tolerate contamination at some level that will avoid
harming the vast majority of the population. MCLs fill the role of
determining these levels to a reasonable extent of scientific possibility.
2.

MCLs as an Accurate PredictorofHarm

The question of whether courts may rely upon MCLs to reflect accurately
an injury has two sub-parts. The first issue to address is whether
considerations of non-health factors, such as economic or technical
feasibility, diminish the scientific integrity of the MCL. The second issue is
that MCLs are based on scientific evidence that may become outdated.
Later evidence may require the MCL to be revised downward. Together,
one might protest that MCLs are inaccurate and should not be used to
determine injury. Each of these questions regarding accuracy is addressed
below.
a.

Non-healthfactors diminish the scientific integrity of MCLs

Plaintiffs in the MTBE litigation stringently argued that MCLs are not
actually created to protect the public health. They claimed that MCLGs are
the levels that actually protect the public and that considerations of
"feasibility" (i.e., economic considerations and the availability of treatment
technologies) diminish the integrity of MCLs as public health standards.153
According to the Plaintiffs, MCLs are tainted because they result from "a
political decision susceptible to political interference" and because "[p]ublic
comments opposing views, data, and argument may be submitted by
anyone-including the very polluters or industries whose products
eventually contaminate drinking water."l 54 Thus, according to the Plaintiffs,
courts should disregard MCLs because they are "subjective standards that
are motivated b concerns other than the health, safety, and potability" of
drinking water.'

remediation goals due to technical infeasibility);

NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL,

29 (Nat'l Acad. Press 1994) (common
pump-and-treat groundwater remediation techniques do "not guarantee that all of the
contaminants have been removed from beneath the [contaminated] site").
ALTERNATIVES FOR GROUND WATER CLEANUP

153.

PIs' Resp., supranote 82, at 9.

154. Id. at 10.
155.

Id. at 11.
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According to the MTBE Plaintiffs, the "concerns other than .

.

. health,

safety, and potability"l 56 are (1) the economics of treatment below the MCL;
(2) the technological ability of treatment below the MCL; and (3)
"politics." 157 In other words, the MTBE Plaintiffs stated that MCLGs are
more suited for use as a determination of injury because they are the point at
which there are no known or anticipated health effects.'5 Theoretically, an
MCLG may be a better standard to determine injury in some cases but, for a
number of reasons, those cases will be few. First, a contaminant may not
have an MCLG. In this case, neither EPA nor New York established an
MCLG for MTBE. Second, a contaminant's MCLG may not be lower than
its MCL. For many chemicals, the MCL and the MCLG are the same.1
Third, where the MCLG is lower than the MCL due to the technical
feasibility of treatment, plaintiffs would be burdened with showing that
EPA's determination of the best available technology for treating the
particular contaminant is incorrect.160 As a matter of administrative law, this
may be prohibited as an impermissible collateral attack on an EPA
rulemaking. 16 1 As a matter of standing, however, if the plaintiffs fail to
show that treating contamination down to the MCLG is technologically
feasible, then their claims are not redressable even if they can establish an
injury. Contrary to the MTBE Plaintiffs' emphasis on cost considerations,1 62
MCLs are not routinely revised upward due to economic "feasibility," as
EPA has only done this on three occasions.163 Lastly, the MTBE Plaintiffs'

156.

Id.

157.

Id. at 8-11.

158.

Id. at 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4) (2006)); see also 40 C.F.R. § 141.2

(2012).
159. Compare 40 C.F.R. §§141.50-55 (regarding MCLGs) with 40 C.F.R. §§ 141.6166 (regarding MCLs).
160. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 141.62(c) (ascribing best available technology standards to
meet MCLs for various inorganic chemicals).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a) (requiring challenges to MCLs to be filed in U.S.
Court of Appeals within 45 days of promulgation).
162.

Pls' Resp., supra note 82, at 9.

163.

See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Radionuclides; Final Rule, 65

Fed. Reg. 76,708, 76,714 (Dec. 7, 2000).
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claim that politics taints the MCL process is not realistic either as a matter of
law or science. Nobody could credibly argue that the scientific integrity of
MCLs would actually be improved if they were issued by fiat through a
closed process that excluded relevant data and the opportunity for review
and comment by outside parties. What the MTBE Plaintiffs believed to be
political interference, others call the Administrative Procedure Act (or its
state law analog).
b.

Scientific evidence is not definitive

An additional possible protest against using MCLs is that they are based
on the scientific evidence known at the time and that interpretations of this
evidence will vary. When a health-based standard is revised downward, as
sometimes happens, shouldn't this be interpreted as an admission that the
prior standard did not adequately protect people?1 64 And what faith may we
have in a state MCL when another state uses a lower MCL for that same
contaminant? There is a legitimate concem that we could discover
tomorrow that using the MCLs of today divested plaintiffs of claims
involving future harm. Likewise, there is a legitimate concern that a
plaintiff may lose its tort claims in one state, because of its higher MCL, but
could proceed in the other state with a lower MCL. These problems,
however, are common in tort law and similar situations are routinely
tolerated as unavoidable byproducts of both advances in knowledge and the
diversity of state tort law.
Although an MCL may be revised in the future based on evidence
currently unknown (or known but unappreciated), the lag between medical
research and tort law is a problem that cuts both ways and does not
inherently inure to the benefit of plaintiffs. For example, nine of the twentyone cases that went to trial in the 1980s alleging that the drug Bendectin
caused birth defects resulted in awards for the plaintiffs. 16 5 Subsequent
medical studies, however, have concluded that Bendectin is not
terotogenic.166 The staleness of scientific evidence, or at least the inability
164. See KAMRIN, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that "[i]t is not unusual for standards to
be adjusted as scientific evidence changes. Vulnerability to change should be the first
clue that the certainty of a 'safe' level is not as definite as it appears.").
165. Joseph Sanders, Facts and Issues of the Bendectin Litigation, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 106, 108-09 (2000).
166. See Robert L. Brent, Bendectin: Review of the Medical Literature of a
Comprehensively Studied Human Nonteratogen and the Most Prevalent Tortogen-litigen,
4 REPROD. Toxic. REv. 337 (1995); Jeffrey S. Kutcher et al. Bendectin and birth defects
II: Ecological analyses, 2 BIRTH DEFECTS REs. 67, 88-97 (2003).
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to know what findings research will yield in the future, is already an issue in
tort law. Using the MCLs to define an injury does not create a new problem
but it is at least consistent with an existing one. The potential reliance upon
stale scientific evidence that may be contradicted sometime in the future is
present in any tort case involving expert testimony or scientific issues in
general. At least MCLs are subject to a more thorough and objective review
of the evidence than what is typically done at a trial. 67 Although scientific
consensus is not a guarantee of accuracy, at least errors and fringe theories
receive the critical scrutiny that they require.
Disparity in how evidence is interpreted is also an unavoidable facet of
science. To the MTBE Plaintiffs, however, the fact that state MCLs for
MTBE could vary widely (10 ppb for New York but 240 ppb for Texas)
could only be the product of corruption and collusion.' 6 8 Even if such a
cynical view, which discounts the possibility of good-faith disagreement in
how scientific evidence is interpreted, were correct in any one specific case,
tort law discrepancies between states are nothing new. Contrary to the
MTBE Plaintiffs' assertions, there is nothing inequitable or unseemly about
two states adopting different MCLs. Variability in state standards,
regulations, and tort law is a fact of life that has come to be widely accepted.
For example, state treatment of medical monitoring claims vary widely.169
And some states are more tolerant than others of alternative liability theories
when plaintiffs cannot make a traditional showing of causation. o It has

167.

See 42 U.S.C.

§ 300g-1(b)(3)(A) (2006) (requiring the use of "the best available,

peer-reviewed science and supporting studies conducted in accordance with sound and
objective scientific practices" and "data collected by accepted methods or best available
methods" in setting MCLs).
168.

Pls' Resp., supra note 82, at 10-11.

169. See, e.g., Adam Joffe, The Medical Monitoring Remedy: Ongoing Controversy
anda ProposedSolution, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 663, 669-672 (2010).
170. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (creating market
share liability by holding all defendants liable for damages based on their market share at
the time of the injury unless individual defendants can prove they did not cause the
injury); In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(noting that five states adopted Sindell to allow for market share liability in certain types
of cases); Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005) (recognizing
"risk-contribution rule" which shifted burden of proof to defendants even when plaintiff

had available claims against other parties that did not require alternative liability
theories), but see Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (E.D. Wis. 2010)

(ruling that risk contribution rule violates Due Process Clause).
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long been a fact of American tort law that plaintiffs and defendants receive
differing treatment and burdens depending on the location of the lawsuit.1
In other words, living with your state's MCL is no different than living with
any other aspect of its tort law.
3.
Requiring More than De Minimis Injury Is Not a "License to
Pollute"

The use of MCLs, even if they fall short of "aspirational goals,"l72 is
perfectly compatible with defining an injury under existing tort law. Courts
generally recognize that there is some de minimis level below which
contamination will not give rise to a tort claim.173 The MTBE Plaintiffs
characterized this as a "license to contaminate up to the MCL,"1 74 however,
requiring some de minimis injury is in accordance with long-standing rules
that invasions of protected interests must be of some substance before an
injury accrues.
In toxic tort cases, it is not enough for plaintiffs to show the existence of
some contamination. They must also allege some type of palpable injury as
well. For example, in many trespass actions involving "imperceptible"
contamination, plaintiffs must generally show some type of "substantial
damage . . . to the res upon which the trespass occurs" to the point where it

171. Actions for medical monitoring are a good example of how state tort law treats
plaintiffs differently depending upon the jurisdiction. For instance, while some states
allow medical monitoring actions, see, e.g., Ayers v. Jason Twp., 525 A.2d 287 (N.J.
1987), others do not recognize the claim. See e.g., Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701
N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005) (rejecting claim for medical monitoring without physical
manifestation of injury). Even where jurisdictions recognize medical monitoring,
plaintiffs can be treated differently. ComparePotter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863
P.2d 795, 801, 824 (Cal. 1993) (stating that medical monitoring is a form of damages
available only after "liability is established under traditional tort theories of recovery"),
with Redland Soccer v. Dep't of Army, 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997) (recognizing medical
monitoring as a separate cause of action).
172. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 3526,
3534 (Jan. 30, 1991).
173. An exception being claims of trespass, where common law may allow a finding
of liability regardless of whether there is any injury to property. Damages in these types
of cases, however, are nominal. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) ("Commonlaw courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of certain 'absolute' rights that are
not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a nominal sum of money.").
174.

Pls' Resp., supra note 82, at 6.
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interferes with the exclusive possession of the property.17 5 For nuisance
claims, plaintiffs must show that contamination rises to a level that interferes
with the use and enjoyment of that property.' 76 In Bradley v. American
Smelting & Refining Co., for instance, plaintiffs sued in trespass and
nuisance alleging nothing more than that trace amounts of cadmium and lead
particles had settled on their property over the years as a result of the
defendants' activities.177 It was undisputed that "the presence of these
materials has had no demonstrable effect on plaintiffs' property."' 78 The
court held that, without this "demonstrable effect," the plaintiffs lacked an
injury. 79 Similarly, a plaintiff alleging negligence must show that a present
injury has either already manifested itself or that "future effects of a present
injury ... are reasonably certain to occur."180 But a plaintiff has no injury
simply because a contaminant is present in the water supply (in the case of a
water supplier, like the MTBE Plaintiffs) or in a person's body (in the case of
a supplier's customer).
The MCL allows a court to define such a
"demonstrable effect" in a way that is more consistent, objective, and
scientific than resorting to expert testimony on a case-by-case basis.
The majority of courts that have heard the issue have accepted MCLs as a
dividing line for establishing injuries. A Florida case presented very similar
factual circumstances to the MTBE litigation and came to the opposite
conclusion.

In Emerald Coast Utilities Authority v. 3M Co., the plaintiff

175. Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 635 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (W.D. Wash.
1986) (adopting rule of Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979) );
see also Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 636 F.3d 88, 96 (4th Cir. 2011)
(under West Virginia law plaintiffs must show that contamination "damaged or interfered
with the plaintiffs' possession and use of their property").
176.

Bradley, 635 F. Supp. at 1157-58.

177.

Id at 1155-56.

178.

Id at 1157.

179.

Id

180. Rhodes, 636 F.3d at 94 (citing Cook v. Cook, 607 S.E.2d 459, 464 (W. Va.
2004)).
181. See City of Moses Lake v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1184-85 (E.D.
Wash. 2006) (relying on Bradley to hold that the presence of trace contamination in an
aquifer alone does not constitute an injury and dismissing the plaintiffs trespass and
nuisance claims).
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water provider filed a tort and products liability action against three
companies, claiming that minute amounts of perfluorooctanoic acid
("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonate ("PFOS") contaminated drinking
water wells.182 The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground
that plaintiff lacked a cognizable injury to support Article III standing,
arguing that the PFOA and PFOS contamination was below state and federal
standards. 183
The opposition of Emerald Coast Utilities Authority
("ECUA") closely resembled that of the MTBE Plaintiffs, arguing that the
contaminants were "an unwelcome impurity in the ECUA water supply" and
that expert testimony would demonstrate that they were potentially
harmful.1 84 Again, as with the MITBE Plaintiffs, ECUA argued that low
levels of contamination would require testing, monitoring, and
remediation. 85
The court granted defendants summary judgment, explicitly rejecting the
MTBE decision,186 finding that ECUA would not be injured until it was
"compelled to monitor the chemicals" or remediate contamination pursuant
to the direction of the EPA or Florida Department of Environmental
Protection.'" The court rejected the ECUA's expert testimony that there is
no safe level of exposure to PFOA and PFOS. Instead, it relied upon an
EPA Provisional Health Advisory for PFOA and PFOS which lacks the legal
enforceability of an MCL.
Citing these, the court concluded that it is not
enough for chemicals to be "unwelcome;" these claims "must be
accompanied by some evidence of a concrete and particularized harm to
ECUA as a result of the chemicals' presence in its water supply." 89 The
ECUA case departs from the MTBE decision in that it relied upon an EPA
Provisional Health Advisory ("PHA") described by EPA as "reflect[ing]
182. Emerald Coast Utils. Auth. v. 3M Co., 746 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219 (N.D. Fla.
2010).
183.

Id. at 1218.

184.

Id. at 1222-23 (internal quotes omitted).

185.

Id. at 1228.

186.

Id. at 1228.

187.

Id. at 1231-32.

188.

Emerald Coast Utils. Auth., 746 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.

189.

Id. at 1232.
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reasonable health-based hazard concentrations above which action should be
taken to reduce exposure to unregulated contaminants in drinking water." 90
Although a non-enforceable PHA is less stringent than an MCL, and one
court has rejected its use,191 ECUA is one of several cases that has accepted
health-based regulatory standards as defining the amount of contamination
necessary to constitute an injury.192
In breaking with this principle, the MTBE court allowed the Plaintiffs to
take their amorphous claims of injury from de minimis MTBE contamination
to a jury. The court did not require any showing of a "detrimental effect" to
survive a motion for summary judgment.193 This creates obvious problems.
Treating the presence of even de minimis amounts of contamination as a

190.

EPA, PROVISIONAL

HEALTHIER ADVISORIES FOR PERFLUOROOCTANOIC

ACID

(PFOA)
AND
PERFLUOROOCTANE
SULFONATE
(PFOS)
1
n. 1 (2009),
http://water.epa.gov/action/advisories/drinking/upload/2009_0115_criteria-drinking-ph
a-PFOAPFOS.pdf.
191. See Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 751, 764-65
(S.D.W. Va. 2009).
192. See In re Wildewood Litig., 52 F.3d 499, 503 (4th Cir. 1995) (TCE levels below
"the level of toxicological concern" as defined by the MCL, did not unreasonably
interfere with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property); Brooks v. E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 944 F. Supp. 448, 449 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (contamination below the
MCL does not constitute an injury because the "General Assembly has apparently
determined that levels of contaminants which fall below the maximum allowable
concentration do not pose a threat; rather, such levels pose an acceptable risk");
Cereghino v. Boeing Co., 873 F. Supp. 398, 403 (D. Or. 1994) (plaintiffs were not
injured where trichloroethane concentrations were below the MCL; rejected plaintiffs'
claim that such a holding constitutes a "pollution easement" in favor of the defendants);
Gleason v. Town of Bolton, 2002 WL 1555320 (Mass. Super. 2002) (MTBE
contamination below the MCL does not constitute an injury); Rose v. Union Oil Co.,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 967 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (petroleum constituent contamination below
the MCL does not present a risk to health or unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs'
use of the land).
193. It should be noted that the MTBE plaintiffs alleged that the presence of MTBE at
extremely low levels could result in a foul taste and odor in drinking water and presented
expert testimony to that effect. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 458 F. Supp. 2d 149,
154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). It was undisputed, however, that the plaintiffs had never
received a taste or odor complaint from a customer that the plaintiffs could attribute to
MTBE, despite having served drinking water with low levels of MTBE to their customers
for years. Id. at 159.
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potential injury, even without any detrimental effect, would put defendants
at the mercy of improving detection technology. For example, if a
manufacturer's chemical is not detected in drinking water at a 4 parts per
billion detection limit, then there is no injury. When technology improves,
however, and the chemical is now detected at 4 parts per trillion, an injury
suddenly appears-even though the people who drank this water are still as
healthy as they were before. Not only does this drive the definition of an
injury away from the traditional standing inquiry, but no potential defendant
would suffer worse than water providers. The City of New York's annual
drinking water report, for example, shows trace amounts of dozens of
contaminants ranging from barium to lead in drinking water.194 The City,
however, maintains that "tap water is safe to drink" because the
contaminants are below the MCLs. 195 Yet, if held to its own argument, all of
its customers could successfully plead injuries from consuming the water
without alleging that these contaminants caused any detrimental effect to
their health. 6 When detection technology improves even further, a myriad
Water providers, like the MTBE
of new contaminants would appear.
Plaintiffs, could be dogged with never-ending rounds of litigation as each of
the water provider's annual reports would admit to another year of serving
trace amounts of chemicals to its customers. These water providers could
sink under the financial burden of litigation, yet none of their customers
would ever have to allege that the water made them sick.
Claiming a right to contaminant-free water has no basis in law and
obtaining it is simply not possible in real life.19 7 An earlier MTBE decision,
however, claimed to find one, boldly stating that "[i]t is beyond cavil that the
public has a ri ht to soil and water that is free from environmental
contamination."1 This opinion affirmed that private property owners who
194. NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., NEW YORK CITY 2010 DRINKING
(2010), www.nyc.gov/html/
REPORT
10-11
QUALITY
WATER SUPPLY AND

dep/pdf/wsstate 10.pdf.
195.

Id. at 2.

196. This was apparently not lost on the MTBE plaintiffs as the defendants pointed out
that the MTBE plaintiffs are lobbying to shield themselves from the potential of similar
lawsuits filed by their customers. Defs' MSJ, supra note 77, at 5.
197. See Pharmaceuticals in the Nation's Water, supra note 3; see also Shotyk &
Krachler, supra note 4.
198. In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 117 Misc. 2d 960, 968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
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relied on their wells for drinking water properly pled a nuisance claim by
alleging that MTBE contamination interfered with the use and enjoyment of
their property. 199 The court never engaged the question of whether
contamination below the MCL constituted an injury. What is worse is that
the case relied upon for the uncompromising claim that "the public has a
right to soil and water that is free from environmental contamination"; State
v. Schenectady Chemicals, Inc., said nothing of the sort.

Schenectady

Chemicals only held that, by the public trust doctrine, the State of New York
generally had standing to pursue claims for the pollution of waters of the
state. 20 0 Taking the MTBE court's 2001 decision seriously is an untenable
proposition. In practice, the law can no more guarantee "soil and water that
is free from environmental contamination" than it can guarantee a life free
from risk or unhappiness.
Contrary to what the MTBE Plaintiffs alleged, drawing a line somewhere
is clearly warranted. The question is whether this line should be drawn by
regulatory agencies in the form of an MCL and applied throughout the state
or by juries, in the form of a verdict, on a case-by-case basis. The MCL acts
as a regulatory demarcation of when the contamination of drinking water
crosses the traditional tort law boundary from de minimis presence to
constituting a "detrimental effect." Despite the MTBE Plaintiffs' protests
that such a scheme would grant a defendant a "license to pollute up to the
MCL," it is far more consistent with traditional tort law standing than the
alternative accepted by the MTBE court.
D.

Reliance on MCLs is Preferable to Reliance on Juries

Defining an injury through a jury verdict, as the MTBE court ordered, has
several obvious downsides. First, it is inconsistent. The presence of a
particular contaminant at 9 ppb may not constitute an injury to one jury, but
its presence at 2 ppb could constitute an injury for another jury, even when
both are sitting in the same state and working with the same jury
instructions. Such results are virtually arbitrary. Second, there is no prior
notice given to defendants. Although this may be less important to industrial
defendants, for water providers the distinction is vital. No drinking water is
free of contaminants regardless of whether it flows from a tap or is sold in a
bottle. This means that water providers may be committing a tort during
every day of their operation, yet this could never be determined until a
particular jury reached its verdict. No advanced notice to potential
defendants is possible under the MTBE court's opinion.
199. Id. at 599, 629.
200. Schenectady Chems., 117 Misc. 2d at 968.
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These two consequences, however, have the same cause: the existence of
injury is based on a review of scientific evidence presented in a litigation
setting, instead of in a regulatory setting. Jurors will hear competing expert
testimony and then determine whether the particular contaminant(s) at issue
are harmful or require remediation at the levels present (or in the MTBE
case, levels that may be present in the future based on groundwater modeling
and predictions of contaminant breakdown). One need not take as cynical a
view as Peter Huber 201 to believe that the presentation of scientific findings
and opinions in a courtroom is less than optimal. Plaintiffs' attorneys can be
especially prone to calling experts that advocate fringe theories that have not
(often for good reason) been vetted by other scientists working in their
field. 202 However, even where the scientific theories at issue are above the
derided "junk science" level, the number of witnesses that will be called in a
particular case present a miniscule percentage of those professionals
working in the relevant field. Although experts may rely upon peerreviewed and generally accepted studies (or they may not), the work they do
for the litigation is typically not subject to peer review. 20 The result is that
experts can pitch theories to juries that they would never proffer to their
peers.
Even where all expert witnesses operate at the highest levels of
competence and honesty, determining when trace levels of contaminants
have or will cause an injury remains problematic. Few jurors may be
familiar with the scientific concepts on display at trial-ranging from
biodegradation to toxicology to groundwater modeling-and those that are
may be excluded from the jury panel. Although many people freely absorb

201.

See generally PETER HUBER,

COURTROOM

GALILEO's REVENGE:

JUNK SCIENCE IN THE

(Basic Books 1991) (severely criticizing the use of scientific experts in

litigation).
202. See, e.g., Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (plaintiffs' expert
claimed low level radio frequency radiation from cellular phones cause various brain
injuries and cancer); Hazlehurst v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 604 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (involving claims that the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine causes
autism); Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 781 (10th Cir. 2009) (forwarding
theory that bacteria in waterbodies could be traced back to the land application of poultry
litter).
203. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.
1986) ("We know from our judicial experience that many such [experts] present studies
and express opinions that they might not be willing to express in an article submitted to a
refereed journal of their discipline or in other contexts subject to peer review.").
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popular science,204 it may be difficult for even committed and attentive
jurors to understand a one-time oral presentation (with, at best, a slide show)
on very complex scientific matters. Of course, for those jurors that are
disinterested, undisciplined, or already convinced that the subject matter is
beyond their understanding, expert witnesses are essentially testifying for
the record. The result is that jurors are often left to make a scientific
determination based on a morality play centering on attorneys' accusations
about paid experts, junk science, supposedly excessive corporate profits,
and/or other alleged misdeeds.
Reliance on the MCL is a more preferable means of defining an injury
than throwing the matter over to the jury. Despite being derided by the
MTBE Plaintiffs as "politically driven,"205 the MCL process surely has more
scientific credibility than defining injuries through litigation. Agencies set
MCLs based on the work of a large body of generally unbiased experts and
work through that information over the course of several months or years.206
By contrast, the MTBE opinion leaves the question to panels of biased
experts that duel for a few days before a slate of jurors with generally no
scientific background and varied (but undisclosed) biases, intelligence
levels, and attention spans. To describe this process as less than optimal is
being charitable.

204. For example, Stephen Hawking's book, A BriefHistory of Time, has sold over 10

million copies, making him an international celebrity, or at least popular enough to
warrant multiple guest appearances on The Simpsons. See Natalie Paris, Hawking to
experience
zero
gravity,
LONDON
TELEGRAPH
(Apr.
26,
2007),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1549770/Hawking-to-experience-zerogravity.html; see also The Simpsons: They Saved Lisa's Brain (Fox television broadcast
May 9, 1999); The Simpsons: Don't Fear the Roofer (Fox television broadcast May 1,
2005); The Simpsons: Elementary School Musical (Fox television broadcast Sept. 26,
2010).
205.

Pls' Resp., supra note 82, at 11.

206. To take just one example, the MCL for asbestos was based on what EPA deemed
to be "sufficient health and occurrence data" and animal studies showing that oral
administration of asbestos can cause benign polyps. National Primary Drinking Water
Regulations; Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 3526, 3535 (Jan. 30, 1991). When commenters
challenged EPA's finding that ingested asbestos was a "Group C" carcinogen (limited
evidence of carcinogenicity), the Agency pushed back with the support of studies by the
National Toxicology Program on animals, the findings of the EPA Science Advisory
Board, and a study by the National Research Council on occupational exposure. Id. at
3535-36.
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Deference to AdministrativeAgencies Will Benefit Litigation and
Avoid Disruptingthe MCL Program

Given the qualitative differences in the two alternatives, courts should
defer to administrative agencies, consistent with the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, instead of tendering scientific questions of injury to juries.2
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that, on highly technical
regulatory matters, coordination between the judiciary and administrative
agencies is necessary.208 The purpose is to avoid a ruling which "might
disturb or disrupt the regulatory regime of the agency in question" and allow
for "uniformity in the interpretation and application of a . . . regulatory

regime."209 The U.S. Supreme Court has particularly stressed that the
doctrine is best invoked for questions requiring "the expert and specialized
knowledge of the agencies," 21 for "cases raising issues of fact not within the
conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of
administrative discretion."211
Such reasoning is particularly apt for questions surrounding when a
particular contaminant may cause harm to human health or whether property
or an aquifer requires remediation. The ultimate question of injury turns on

207. The primary jurisdiction doctrine usually requires courts to retain jurisdiction
over a case while it refers a regulatory question to an agency for an administrative ruling.
Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993); United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S.
59, 64 (1956). In cases such as the MTBE litigation, however, the agency has already

made its administrative ruling. This leaves the judge only with the task of applying the
agency's standard to the case.
208. Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400
U.S. 62, 69 (1970); see also W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64.
209.

Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 163 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir.

1998) (citing 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 14.1 272 (3d ed. 1994)). The

American Auto court referenced the need for "national uniformity in the interpretation
and application of a federal regulatory regime," id., however, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is just as useful in allowing uniform application of state MCLs. As discussed
supra, under the MTBE court's decision, juries could arrive at differing determinations of
what constitutes an injury for the same contaminant within the same state.
210.

W. Pac.R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64.

211.

Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
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whether exposure to a chemical has or will cause harm to persons. 212
Answering this question involves the type of "expert and specialized
knowledge" maintained by state and federal environmental agencies. It is
through the application of this expertise and specialized knowledge that the
MCLs were issued to begin with. Sending the question of injury to a jury is
essentially re-doing the work of the expert agency but without the expertise.
The second rationale for the primary jurisdiction doctrine, avoiding the
disruption of a regulatory regime, is equally applicable to this situation.
Arbitrary and inconsistent jury findings as to what level of a particular
contaminant is injurious, creates the potential for varying results within the
United States (for federal MCLs) or even within the same state (for state
MCLs). This destroys the uniformity of regulations that is one of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine's key foundations. Further, it seems to render
the purpose of the MCL meaningless. Why set standards for drinking water
only to have judges and juries ignore them? Water providers may avoid
penalties from EPA or state agencies by meeting the MCL, but they would
still be exposed to liability through a separate (case-by-case) standard to be
established by a jury in the future. The purpose of having primary and
secondary MCLs-to define a level where drinking water is deemed to be
safe and aesthetically acceptable-disappears through the fear of large
damage awards. Where a state or federal agency has issued an MCL
through a scientific review process, judges should consider the matter settled
and refrain from re-opening the question of injury over and over again with
each trial.
V.

CONCLUSION

The MTBE court's dismissal of MCLs as merely "convenient
guidepost[s]" is an unfortunate license for arbitrary standing decisions. If
the court's reasoning is followed en masse, any party accused of fouling
drinking water sources, or serving drinking water with any measurable level
of contaminants, must resign their fate to the whims of juries. No objective,
uncontroverted facts could cut short suits by plaintiffs claiming a right to
water without even a single molecule of contamination-a commodity that
does not exist. Any defendant, facing the expensive prospect of a suit that
must, as a matter of law, endure until trial, where it then faces the potential
for exorbitant damage awards, will face nearly insurmountable pressure to

212. Even if the plaintiff is a water provider seeking damages for remediation, as in
the MTBE litigation, the issue of whether a drinking water source requires remediation,
and if so, to what levels returns to the question of whether the contaminant concentrations
are high enough to harm their customers.
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settle even meritless cases. None of this is necessary if courts afford MCLs
the weight that they are due.

